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Abstract 
 
 
To overcome the problem of insufficient research and development (R&D) on vaccines for 
diseases concentrated in low-income countries, sponsors could commit to purchase viable 
vaccines if and when they are developed.  One or more sponsors would commit to a 
minimum price that would be paid per person immunized for an eligible product, up to a 
certain number of individuals immunized. For additional purchases, the price would 
eventually drop to short-run marginal cost. If no suitable product were developed, no 
payments would be made. We estimate the offer size which would make the revenues from 
R&D investments on a malaria vaccine similar to revenues realized from investments in 
typical existing commercial pharmaceutical products, as well as the degree to which various 
contract models and assumptions would affect the cost-effectiveness of such a commitment 
for the case of a malaria vaccine. Under conservative assumptions, we document that the 
intervention would be highly cost-effective from a public health perspective. Sensitivity 
analyses suggest most characteristics of a hypothetical malaria vaccine would have little effect 
on the cost-effectiveness, but that the duration of protection against malaria conferred by a 
vaccine strongly affects potential cost-effectiveness.   Readers can conduct their own 
sensitivity analyses employing a web-based spreadsheet tool. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Compared to the social need, there is a dearth of research and development (R&D) 
on vaccines for malaria and other diseases concentrated in low-income countries.  One 
commonly cited estimate is that half of all global health R&D in 1992 was undertaken by 
private industry – but that less than 5 percent of that was spent on diseases specific to poor 
countries (WHO [1996]). 
 
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms that operate under a profit-maximizing 
business model are reluctant to invest in R&D for these diseases if they fear they would be 
unable to sell the vaccine at prices that would cover their risk-adjusted costs. The low 
anticipated price reflects both the poverty of the relevant populations as well as severe 
distortions in markets for vaccines for these diseases.  
 
Two major distortions are relevant for these markets.  First, governments and other 
institutions that buy vaccines for these diseases, such as bilateral and multilateral aid 
agencies, face a time-inconsistency problem.  Once pharmaceutical companies have invested 
in the R&D necessary to develop vaccines, in the interest of increasing access to life-saving 
products governments and aid institutions often use their powers as dominant purchasers 
and arbiters of intellectual property rights to keep prices close to marginal cost.  Because the 
largest part of the industry’s expenditures lies in the initial R&D cost (while the variable 
costs of production are typically modest), this may imply negative total profits from the 
investment, thereby deterring industry from investing in the first place.   
 
Second, the knowledge generated by research on these diseases is an “international 
public good.”  Because the benefits of scientific and technological advances spill over to 
many nations, none of the many small countries that would benefit from a malaria, 
tuberculosis, or HIV vaccine has an incentive to encourage research by unilaterally offering 
to pay higher prices.   
 
One way to address these market failures would be for purchasers (for example, 
foreign aid donors) to commit, in advance of product development and licensure, to fully or 
partially finance vaccine purchases for poor countries at a pre-specified price. A financially 
(and otherwise) credible program sponsor (or coalition of sponsors) would sign a contract 
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specifying that a minimum price per person immunized would be paid, up to a certain 
number of individuals immunized. This type of arrangement would reduce economic 
uncertainty for firms and give investors confidence about the returns they could expect once 
the scientific challenges were overcome.  While the arrangement would not eliminate all risk 
to developers, it would greatly reduce the uncertainties that are specific to markets in low-
income countries, and would thereby put diseases like malaria on more equal footing with 
health conditions of affluent populations in R&D allocation decisions. 
 
This type of initiative, referred to as a “pull mechanism” or “advance purchase 
commitment,” has recently been gathering momentum, thus providing additional motivation 
for examining the details of how such a vaccine purchase commitment could be 
implemented.  For example, in late November 2004 Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown, committed his government, in cooperation with other donors, to 
purchasing a malaria vaccine if and when it is developed (Brown [2004]). 
 
Kremer and Glennerster [2004] lay out the rationale for such a commitment and 
discuss the details of how such a commitment could be structured, such as eligibility 
requirements.1  A working group comprised of economists, public health specialists, 
representatives of the biopharmaceutical industry, and others, working with contract 
attorneys knowledgeable about the pharmaceutical industry, was convened by the Center for 
Global Development in Washington, D.C., and has developed a report that specifies in 
further detail how such a commitment could be implemented (Levine et al. [2005]).2   
 
In this article, we estimate what size of a commitment would provide a market 
comparable to those of existing pharmaceuticals; we then discuss the cost-effectiveness of 
such a program under various contract models and assumptions.  We here focus on the 
example of a malaria vaccine; although not discussed here, analogous estimates for HIV and 
                                                 
1 The idea of encouraging R&D by committing to purchase vaccines once they are developed was discussed by 
the WHO [1996] and was advocated by a coalition of organizations coordinated by the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative at the 1997 Denver G-8 summit.  The World Bank AIDS Vaccine Task Force [2000] (see 
also Rosenhouse [1999]) explored this idea further.  Sachs [1999] and Sachs and Kremer [1999] have advocated 
the establishment of such programs in the popular press.  Maurer et al. [2004] also offer a discussion of advance 
purchase commitments.   
2 This report is available online at http://www.cgdev.org/.      
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tuberculosis vaccines can be derived via the downloadable spreadsheet tool we discuss in 
Section 4.  
 
 We take the net present value (NPV) of revenues earned by the average of a sample 
of recently launched commercial products, adjusted for lower marketing costs, as our 
benchmark revenue.  To preview our results, we find that a commitment to pay $15 per 
person immunized for the first 200 million people would provide a market comparable in 
size to this benchmark revenue, and would also be highly cost-effective from a public health 
perspective.    
 
2.  Background on malaria 
 
` The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that more than 300 million people 
contract clinical malaria every year, and that 1.1 million annually die of the disease (WHO 
[2001]).  Children who survive severe cases of malaria may suffer learning disorders and 
brain damage, although those who reach age five acquire some immunity.  Those with this 
limited natural immunity rarely die from malaria, but they often become weak and lethargic 
with the disease later in life, thus impairing productivity.  Almost all malaria cases occur in 
low-income countries, and about 90 percent of the victims live in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 
[2000b]). 
 
The scientific challenges in developing an effective malaria vaccine are formidable.  
Nonetheless, many scientists are optimistic.  A National Academy of Sciences report [1996] 
concluded that the development of a malaria vaccine is scientifically feasible.  More recently, 
in a review article published in The Lancet, Moorthy et al. [2004] argued that, “Although exact 
predictions are not possible, if sufficient funding were mobilized, a deployable, effective 
malaria vaccine is a realistic medium-term to long-term goal.”  Other scientists, however, are 
more pessimistic about the scientific prospects for a malaria vaccine being developed 
through the research avenues currently being explored.  Kremer and Glennerster [2004] 
argue that such instances in which there exist such a divergence of opinion on scientific 
prospects for development are especially well-suited for programs such as purchase 
commitments.   
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There has also been encouraging news more recently, with the release of results from 
a recently completed phase IIb malaria vaccine clinical trial.  That vaccine has been under 
development at GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals for more than fifteen years, and the vaccine 
came off the shelf with an influx of financial support, in large part from the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation.  The phase IIb trial was conducted under what is often referred to as a 
“public-private partnership,” with players including MVI (the Malaria Vaccine Initiative, 
mostly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation), GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, and 
the Mozambique Ministry of Health.  The study, published in The Lancet, found that the 
vaccine’s efficacy against severe malaria disease was 58 percent, and argued the results of the 
trial “demonstrate the feasibility of an efficacious vaccine against malaria” (Alonso et al. 
[2004]).  Of course there are many steps before this vaccine or others would be ready for 
widespread use. However, of primary concern is whether the necessary financial resources 
will be invested to move this and other candidate malaria vaccines further along in the 
development pipeline. Malaria vaccine purchase commitments, like Britain’s, can provide 
financial incentives to pull this candidate vaccine through costly phase III clinical trials and 
other steps required for licensure, towards potential delivery.  Our work explores the details 
of how such commitments might be designed and implemented.   
 
3.  Estimates of the necessary size of a vaccine purchase commitment3 
 
We begin by estimating the total vaccine purchase commitment size that would be 
necessary to provide a market comparable to revenues provided by existing commercial 
products. The resulting dollar amount can then be used to analyze how different prices and 
quantities specified by the contract would compare to the revenues of commercial products. 
As described in this section, in deriving our estimates we consider reported sales numbers of 
existing commercial products, and adjust these empirical numbers according to the 
particularities of a vaccine purchase commitment. Specifically, the main approach of our 
analysis is to estimate a scale of possible revenue levels that would make the revenues from 
investing in R&D for a malaria vaccine similar to the revenues realized from investments in 
existing products.4   
                                                 
3 For details on the sales revenue data used in this section, see the Appendix.  This data is also available online 
at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/vaccine.html.   
4  See Berndt et al. [2003] for other approaches and further discussion.   
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The most recent comprehensive evidence of sales revenues for biopharmaceutical 
products is a paper by Grabowski et al. [2002] in which the authors report on 118 new 
chemical entities (NCEs) that were introduced into the U.S. pharmaceutical market between 
1990 and 1994.5  An important finding in the Grabowski et al. paper is that the revenue 
distribution over the sample set of products is not only widely distributed, but is also highly 
skewed.6  In particular, in the Grabowski et al. [2002] sample the top selling 10 percent of 
products earn approximately half of the total market revenues (in terms of worldwide sales). 
Using separate estimates of the cost of pharmaceutical development, Grabowski et al. also 
find that sales revenues of the median NCE are insufficient to break even, implying the mean 
sales revenue may provide a more reliable estimate of what level of expected revenues may 
be effective in spurring industry investment.   
 
We obtained the sales revenue data compiled by Grabowski et al. [2002].  The 
analysis presented in Grabowski et al. [2002] utilized this sales data in combination with 
estimates on the cost of pharmaceutical development in order to estimate total returns; we 
did not use those cost of development estimates nor any other cost of development 
estimates in our analysis.  Our focus here is strictly on using sales revenue data to estimate 
the size of commitment needed to generate a market comparable in size to the sales 
revenues of products in the Grabowski et al. sample.  
 
 
 
We assume an estimated industry-wide real cost of capital (that is, earnings foregone 
on other investment opportunities) of 8 percent, close to the annual average return on the 
                                                 
5 Grabowski et al. note this is a comprehensive sample of the NCEs originating from and developed by the 
pharmaceutical industry that were introduced into the U.S. in the 1990 to 1994 time period.  Due to data 
limitations we are unable to address whether the sales revenues of this sample of self-originated NCEs is a 
representative sample of the sales revenues of all commercial pharmaceutical products.  Sales revenue data 
from a larger sample of products is available from (for example) IMS Health or Scott Levin Associates, but is 
very expensive.  Further work could attempt to pursue this and other potential sources of larger samples of 
sales revenue data. 
6 This finding is consistent with the findings of analogous earlier work on products introduced in the 1980s, 
such as Grabowski and Vernon [1990]. 
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stock market (Siegal [1998]).7  This real rate of 8 percent is equivalent to a nominal cost of 
capital of 11 percent, assuming 3 percent inflation.  Using the sales revenue data together 
with this assumption of an 8 percent real cost of capital, the NPV of revenues (pre-tax, and 
gross of plant, equipment, promotion and marketing, production, and distribution cost) 
derived over the life cycle of the average product in the Grabowski et al. sample is $3.44 
billion (in 2004 dollars).8   
 
The revenues reported by Grabowski et al. [2002] are partially spent on marketing.  
Since under a vaccine purchase commitment a potential vaccine manufacturer would likely 
need to spend considerably less than average on marketing, we take this into account and 
consequently adjust down our estimates as derived above.  Rosenthal et al. [2002] estimate 
that, relative to sales, expenditures on promotion by U.S. pharmaceutical companies have 
remained fairly constant at about 15 percent of revenues, and have fallen slightly since 1998.9 
It is plausible, however, that promotion/sales ratios are lower in Europe and elsewhere 
globally. In this sense the 15 percent number can be interpreted as an upper bound of what 
should be deducted from the overall purchase commitment size. Furthermore, in the U.S. 
the 15 percent ratio is partly the result of an accounting nuance, in which values of free 
samples given to physicians by drug representatives are assessed at average retail price, not 
manufacturer's production costs. For most drugs, manufacturers' marginal drug production 
costs are quite low.  Moreover, samples comprise about 50 percent of drug manufacturer's 
total promotional costs in the U.S. (see Rosenthal et al. [2002]).  Given these considerations, 
reducing the commitment size by 10 percent as an adjustment for promotional/marketing 
                                                 
7 Siegal [1998] estimates that the annual average return on the stock market over the time period from 1946-
1998 was 7.8 percent (p. 318).  We approximate this to 8 percent for our analysis. 
8 The appropriate level at which to set the cost of capital is somewhat controversial.  Grabowski et al. assume a 
real cost of capital of 11 percent, and previous analyses by two of the present authors (Kremer and Glennerster 
[2004]) used this assumption in calculating the NPV of revenues from existing commercial products.  In this 
work, our preferred estimates use an assumed 8 percent real cost of capital for two reasons.  First, 8 percent is 
close to the annual average return on the stock market (Siegal [1998]).  Second, this allows for consistency in 
our analysis between estimating the NPV of revenues of existing products and estimating the NPV of revenues 
under a vaccine purchase commitment. With an 11 percent real cost of capital, the NPV of revenues for the 
average product would be $2.81 billion rather than $3.44 billion.   
9 It is worth noting some argue that in fact marketing and related promotion expenditures are a much higher 
percent of revenues; Angell [2004, p. 12], for example, argues they may be as high as 36 percent of revenues.  
While precise measurement of this ratio is inherently difficult (and controversial, given difficulties in allocating 
some educational and R&D activities as partly promotional), we note that the larger percentages, such as those 
cited by Angell, typically refer to total selling and general administrative (S&GA) expenses.  These S&GA 
expenditures include non-marketing related general administration, and therefore likely overstate total 
marketing and related promotion expenditures. 
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expenditures seems appropriate. After this adjustment, the program would need to pay out 
$3.1 billion to match the average revenue brought in by existing NCEs.  
 
The sample of existing products includes the “low-hanging fruit” of products that 
were easy to develop.  To the extent that developing a malaria vaccine is more 
technologically challenging than developing the typical product, the appropriate payment 
would be greater.  On the other hand, the promising results of the recent GSK trials (as 
discussed in Section 2) suggest that developing a malaria vaccine may not be as technically 
difficult as many had previously thought. 
 
 In Table 1, we report the necessary NPVs of sales that would make a malaria 
vaccine comparable to each of five different representative products from the Grabowski et 
al. sample, corresponding to the averages of the five upper deciles of the sales distribution.10 
(Specifically, in the first decile, the reported number represents the average among the top 
selling 10 percent of NCEs. For the second decile, it is the average of the next 10 percent, 
etc.). 
 
Table 1. Net present value (NPV) of sales  
(in 2004 dollars), adjusted down 10 percent for lower marketing costs 
 
Typical 
product in  
1st decile 
Typical 
product in  
2nd decile 
Typical 
product in  
3rd decile 
Average 
product in 
entire 
sample 
Typical 
product in  
4th decile 
Typical 
product in  
5th decile 
15.80 billion 5.73 billion 3.61 billion 3.09 billion 2.48 billion 1.34 billion 
Source: Grabowski et al. [2002] data, authors’ calculations. 
 
The average product lies in the fourth decile of sales, and it can be seen in the table 
that the top two deciles of the distribution generate the largest part of sales revenue. 
Therefore, if the development of a malaria vaccine were to be made comparable to the more 
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profitable existing products, the returns to the supplier would need to be increased 
substantially.11
 
An alternative method of estimating the necessary purchase commitment size would 
be to ask individuals outside of but familiar with the industry their opinion on what level of 
expected revenue is needed to spur substantial R&D investments; these opinions can 
arguably serve as one rough check on our estimates as derived above.  A common 
perception among analysts and potential developers (as well as many in industry) is that large 
biopharmaceutical companies need to anticipate annual sales of $500 million or more in 
years with peak sales, assuming that the revenue distribution over the lifecycle is equal to the 
average distribution in the industry, in order to be willing to invest in R&D for a new 
product (see Robbins-Roth [2000]). Assuming the typical product life cycle as in Grabowski 
et al. [2002] and a real cost of capital of 8 percent, after adjusting down by 10 percent for 
lower marketing costs this corresponds to an NPV of about $3.38 billion, a number fairly 
close to that which our procedure yields.12
 
To summarize our work in this section, an estimate of the net present value of 
revenues that a malaria vaccine commitment would need to offer in order to match existing 
commercial products would be $3.1 billion, in year 2004 dollars.  Because the starting year of 
purchases under the program is highly uncertain, the commitment should be indexed to 
account for inflation. We here express everything in 2004 dollars.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Figures for the 1st decile, 2nd decile, and average product are taken directly from Grabowski et al.’s data.  
Deriving the 3rd, 4th, and 5th decile figures required slight approximation due to data limitations.  Details on 
these calculations are available from the authors. 
11 It is noteworthy that very few of the products in the Grabowski et al. [2002] sample are likely to be vaccines. 
Among the existing vaccines, the hepatitis B vaccine may be the best case to compare a hypothetical malaria 
vaccine to, as it is a relatively new antigen that has seen a widespread increase in demand during the last decade. 
As evidence of a demand-induced R&D activity, Finkelstein [2004] reports an increase in R&D investment on 
hepatitis B vaccines in response to the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP) 
recommendation in 1991 to give hepatitis B immunization to American infants. Immunization rates strongly 
increased thereafter, to almost 90 percent, and a significant number of additional clinical trials were conducted. 
The worldwide market for hepatitis B vaccines currently lies at around $1 billion annually, which makes the set 
of all hepatitis B vaccines comparable in market size to a single product with a NPV of sales (assuming an 8 
percent real cost of capital) of approximately $6.49 billion. Details of this calculation are available from the 
authors. 
12 With an 11 percent real cost of capital (as in Grabowski et al. [2002]), this figure changes from $3.38 billion to 
$2.76 billion.   
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Much has been written recently concerning the apparent low productivity of 
biopharmaceutical R&D investments in generating new therapies and successfully bringing 
them to market.   A pessimistic interpretation of this phenomenon is that new drug and 
biologic development is becoming ever more difficult, and that developing a vaccine for 
malaria will be very, very costly.  On the other hand, industry observers also point out that 
the biopharmaceutical industry is unlikely to be as successful in the future as it has been in 
the past in bringing “blockbuster” drugs to market, and that instead it must focus on more 
targeted and smaller population therapies.  If the latter is true, the implementation of a 
purchase commitment program for a malaria vaccine could be particularly timely for an 
industry that is changing its focus.  
 
4. Cost effectiveness of a vaccine purchase commitment 
 
We now consider the net present value of revenue and health cost-effectiveness 
estimates that would be generated by a vaccine purchase commitment under various 
scenarios.  These estimates have been generated by a spreadsheet tool (available online at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/vaccine.html) that allows the user to 
manipulate all relevant variables in a flexible and user-friendly way, thereby permitting the 
generation and analysis of a large number of different scenarios. 
We will consider the impact of one particular set of contract provisions and vaccine 
characteristics under variable assumptions about which countries would participate in the 
program, vaccine adoption rates, and sources of additional revenue to the vaccine supplier 
(e.g. travelers’ or military purchases). However, these parameters and assumptions can be 
modified in the spreadsheet, thus allowing the user to investigate the impact of alternative 
contract parameters and different assumptions regarding take-up, malaria burden, etc.    For 
example, the spreadsheet allows the user to assess the revenue and cost-effectiveness 
consequences of different combinations of price, quantity, and vaccine characteristics.  
Based on the user inputs as well as recent data compiled on disease burden and population, 
the spreadsheet outputs the cost per disability adjusted life year (DALY) saved by the 
program and the NPV of revenues that would accrue to the vaccine supplier.13  
                                                 
13 Disability adjusted life years, or DALYs, are a commonly used metric which attempt to account for both life 
lost due to premature death and the loss of healthy life resulting from disease morbidity or disability.   
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Since the values of revenues and cost per DALY saved are expressed in real terms at 
the time the vaccine is developed, even though altering the years until a vaccine is developed 
will change the nominal price paid, it will not alter the results of the calculations presented 
here. 
 
As a benchmark for cost-effectiveness comparisons, we note that health 
interventions in the poorest developing countries that cost about $100 per DALY saved are 
generally regarded as highly cost effective (World Bank [1993]).  More recently a country’s 
gross national product (GNP) per capita has also been used as a benchmark (GAVI [2004]; 
WHO [2000a]), and in the United States, the cost-effectiveness threshold is estimated to be 
as high as $50,000 to $100,000 per DALY saved (Neumann et al. [2000]).  As an alternative 
benchmark, even at the lowest of recently negotiated estimates of antiretroviral prices, the 
cost of purchasing and delivering antiretrovirals using a directly observed treatment short-
course (DOTS) is estimated to cost $613 per year of treatment.14
 
To summarize our results as described in this section, we find that under a 
reasonably conservative set of assumptions, a price commitment for a malaria vaccine that 
commits to pay $15 per person immunized (or $5 per dose for a three-dose vaccine) for the 
first 200 million people immunized would cost less than $15 per DALY saved, including 
both purchase and delivery costs of the vaccine. Sales under the program would provide 
about $3.2 billion in total NPV of revenues to the vaccine developer, comparable to the $3.1 
billion in total NPV of revenues of the average product as discussed in Section 3. This result 
is derived from baseline assumptions which are detailed below.  Sensitivity analyses 
presented in Section 5 demonstrate that cost-effectiveness is robust to variation in vaccine 
efficacy, slow or low adoption, and contract provisions, but more sensitive to changes in the 
duration of protection of the vaccine and delivery costs.   
 
 
                                                 
14 Although estimates of the cost of antiretroviral treatment per year of life saved are sensitive to assumptions 
about the cost of delivery and the epidemiological effects of treatment (which could be either positive or 
negative, depending on behavioral response), the 2001 call by 133 Harvard faculty members for antiretroviral 
treatment (Adams et al. [2001]) estimated that purchasing and delivering antiretrovirals using a DOTS approach 
would cost $1,100 per year.  That analysis assumes an average cost of $650 per patient per year for costs of 
antiretrovirals.  Adjusting that analysis for the lowest of the recently negotiated estimates of antiretroviral costs, 
$140 per year (McNeil [2004]), suggests a cost per year of treatment of approximately $613.   
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Contract provisions 
 
 We consider a commitment that would offer an initial price of $15 per person (in 
2004 dollars) for the first 200 million people immunized, after which the price would drop to 
$1 per person immunized.  
 Following the public health literature, we apply a default annual discount rate of 
three percent to future DALYs saved and future expenses to the program sponsor. Firms, 
however, may discount future revenues at a higher rate reflecting the cost of capital. We 
consider a real rate of eight percent, close to the annual average return on the stock market 
(Siegal [1998]). 
 
Vaccine characteristics 
 
In our base case, we consider a three-dose, 60 percent effective vaccine that would 
protect for five years and could be added to the standard package of vaccines that are 
delivered under the WHO’s Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI). That package, 
which includes three contacts with each child, costs $15, or $5 for every contact (World 
Bank [1993]). The majority of this cost is due to delivery costs, as the price of the six 
traditional EPI vaccines is very low. The World Bank estimated that adding the one-dose 
yellow fever vaccine and the fairly expensive three-dose hepatitis B vaccine to the EPI 
package would increase the cost of the package by 15 percent, or $2.25, including both the 
purchase price and the delivery cost (World Bank [1993]).  Both yellow fever and hepatitis B 
were expensive vaccines, so we assume that the incremental cost of adding a three-dose 
vaccine to the EPI package would be no more than $0.75.  However, as discussed in the 
sensitivity analysis below, even at several multiples of this cost, delivery would still be quite 
inexpensive.  (Note that in the spreadsheet tool, extra delivery costs can be specified for 
vaccines that are not compatible with the EPI schedule, but in the base case for malaria 
discussed here we consider vaccines that do conform to the EPI delivery.)  
 
 Vaccine efficacy reflects the percentage of infections that are prevented by 
immunization, and defaults to 60 percent. The duration of protection reflects the number of 
years after immunization that the vaccine protects against infection, and defaults to five 
years. 
11 
                                                                
 
Countries covered 
 
 An important set of assumptions concerns the countries that will participate in the 
program, i.e. the populations for which the vaccine doses will be purchased. This selection 
has a considerable impact on the effectiveness of the program, because the burden of 
malaria and vaccine adoptions rates differs widely across countries. In the spreadsheet tool, 
we allow selection by several different criteria, including a gross national income (GNI) per 
capita cutoff ($1000, the cutoff currently used by the Vaccine Fund15, is the default), a 
‘manual’ selection of countries, and a minimum disease prevalence cutoff.  In the baseline 
case presented here we use the $1000 GNI per capita cutoff to define eligibility, and from 
there assume that eligible countries will participate if vaccination is cost-effective (i.e. less 
than $100 per DALY saved) at delivery cost in that country.  That is, we assume that 
countries in which vaccination would not be cost-effective at delivery cost would not 
participate in the program.  In addition, China is not included in the program because its 
GNI will soon surpass the $1000 cutoff, and because falciparum malaria, the most deadly 
form of malaria, is only a problem for a tiny fraction (less than 1 percent) of China’s 
population.    
 
Adoption 
 
 Obtaining cost-effectiveness estimates for a vaccine requires us to make some 
assumptions about the adoption patterns for the vaccine.  Because there is little historical 
data to guide assumptions, in general we make conservative assumptions about take-up rates.  
In addition, the robustness checks we will present in Section 5 suggest our estimates are 
relatively insensitive to assumptions about adoption. 
 
Adoption of the vaccine will likely gradually increase over several years and 
eventually reach a steady-state level. In our base case scenario we consider a linearly 
                                                 
15 For those readers who may be unfamiliar, the Vaccine Fund is the financing arm to the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI).  The Vaccine Fund offers support to qualifying governments of the 
world’s poorest countries for: (1) new and under-used vaccines; (2) funding to help government strengthen 
their basic immunization services; and (3) safe injection equipment in the form of auto-disable syringes and safe 
disposal boxes.  More information is available online at http://www.vaccinealliance.org.  
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increasing take-up path that takes seven years to reach the steady state.  In this base case, the 
uptake rates for new cohorts (infants) are set to the country-by-country immunization rates 
for the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus three-dose vaccine (DPT3) reported by WHO [2002], 
plus five percentage points.  This assumes that the immunization rates would be at least as 
high as the current DPT3 rates if the vaccine could be added to the EPI schedule.  We argue 
it is appropriate to assume the addition of five percentage points to the current DPT3 rates 
for several reasons, including the likely increase in immunization rates that will result from 
the recent influx of financial support for immunizations (for example, from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation), that economic development that will likely increase 
immunization rates (for example, due to increased urbanization), and that immunization 
rates may be higher if parents value immunization more if a malaria vaccine is available.  The 
spreadsheet also allows the user to base uptake rates on diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus first-
dose (DPT1) or measles coverage rates, or to specify a single rate for all countries.   
 
 In the transition years of the program, there may be backlog immunizations of 
children who have not yet acquired natural immunity to the disease. Given that expanding 
the program beyond those relatively easy to reach will be difficult, we assume that only a 
minority of this population will be reached.  Specifically, we assume that 10 percent of the 
children aged 0-4 will be immunized. 
 
Women temporarily lose their natural immunity to malaria during their first 
pregnancy, and thus we include some immunizations of pregnant women. The number of 
pregnant women who are in their first pregnancy and thus need to be vaccinated is 
approximated by taking one fourth of annual births.16 The default immunization rate for this 
population is set to the tetanus toxoid (TT2) rate reported by WHO [2002] plus five 
percentage points (for the reasons described above).  The tetanus toxoid vaccine is already 
given to pregnant women and thus can serve as a proxy for the availability of vaccinations to 
that group. 
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Additional revenues 
 
 The vaccine developer would also receive revenue outside of program purchases, 
such as private purchases in covered countries and purchases in non-covered countries (such 
as the travelers’ and military markets in high-income countries, as well as middle-income 
countries where malaria is prevalent).  
 
In the base case we project a total market of $750 million in NPV of revenues (2004 
dollars) in high- and middle-income countries.  This estimate is based on annual purchases 
of malaria prophylaxis drugs, as presumably people would be willing to pay comparable 
amounts for a malaria vaccine as for malaria prophylaxis drugs. An estimate from the 
popular press (Reuters [2003]) and correspondence with Pfizer suggest that the annual 
market for malaria prophylaxis drugs from sales to travelers and tourists from industrialized 
countries and the military could be as much as $200 million, but others cite much lower 
figures. If a vaccine captured $100 million in peak sales and the profile of sales over time 
followed that of a typical pharmaceutical in the Grabowski et al. [2002] sample, the total net 
present value of those sales would be about $750.7 million.17 Adding in $100 million of 
additional revenues from private sales in low- and middle-income countries yields a default 
of $850 million in net present value of revenues outside the commitment program.  
  
Baseline results 
 
 Given the assumptions outlined above, along with a recent collection of data from 
the World Health Organization [1997] and the U.S. Bureau of the Census [2000] on disease 
burden and fertility, as well as estimates of the distribution of the burden of disease by age 
and gender, the spreadsheet tool projects the total discounted number of DALYs that would 
be saved by the program.  It also calculates the total cost, including delivery costs, and the 
revenues to the vaccine supplier from purchases at the initial (high) price. The purchases at 
the subsequent lower price are ignored for the NPV calculations because the low price 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 The average fertility rate (births per woman) in low-income countries in 2002 was four (World Bank [2005]), 
hence our assumption of one-fourth of total births being first pregnancies. 
17 With an 11 percent real cost of capital (as in Grabowski et al. [2002]), this figure changes from $750.7 million 
to $613.9 million.  Note that for both of these figures, we have not subtracted out 10 percent for lower 
marketing expenditures, as we did for our previous work, as that correction would here seem inappropriate.  
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would presumably be close to the marginal cost of production and because for later sales it is 
increasingly less likely that the supplier would remain the same.  
 
We then calculate the expected number of DALYs that would be saved by the 
program each year by multiplying the number of immunizations by vaccine efficacy and by 
the DALY burden of disease faced by members of the population immunized over their 
lifetime or the lifetime of the vaccine. The cost of the program in each year is calculated as 
the number of vaccinations multiplied by the total cost of each vaccination (purchase price 
and delivery cost). As previously discussed, we follow the public health literature and 
discount both future DALYs saved and future expenditures to the program sponsor at a real 
discount rate of 3 percent. The total discounted revenue to the supplier in each year is 
calculated as the number of purchases at the initial price multiplied by the initial price, 
discounted at the real cost of capital of 8 percent. In order to evaluate the appropriateness of 
the size of the price commitment, one can then compare the NPV of revenues from a new 
vaccine to the adjusted distribution of revenues from a sample of existing commercial 
products, as detailed in Section 3. 
 
These calculations may underestimate the cost-effectiveness of the vaccine.  For 
example, these calculations do not include any epidemiological benefits—that is, vaccinating 
a significant fraction of the population may slow the spread of a disease, and thus benefits 
may spill over to the unvaccinated.  They also do not include health benefits to people in 
middle- and high-income countries, or benefits to adults in low-income countries who 
purchase a vaccine privately.  They assume that the vaccine would be given randomly 
throughout a country and thus do not factor in any benefits of targeting vaccine delivery 
within countries to areas that have the most severe disease problems.  Finally, they do not 
include the benefits of increasing vaccination rates for other diseases that might result from 
parents bringing their children into clinics to vaccinate them against malaria. 
 
For a given set of specified assumptions, the main outputs of the spreadsheet tool 
are the total NPV of revenues that would accrue to the vaccine supplier and the cost per 
DALY of the vaccine, both in 2004 dollars. Under the base case assumptions described 
above, a commitment to pay $15 per person immunized for the first 200 million individuals 
immunized would produce a total NPV of revenue of $3.2 billion (in 2004 dollars), 
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comparable to the $3.1 billion benchmark for the average existing NCE as discussed in 
Section 3.  
 
The spreadsheet tool also reports the annual number of vaccinations in the steady 
state, the annual number of DALYs saved in the steady state, and the overall cost per DALY 
saved. Under the baseline assumptions, over 54 million people would be immunized 
annually, saving almost 14 million DALYs per year in the steady state. Overall, the program 
would cost less than $15 per DALY saved, which is highly cost effective relative to, for 
example, the $100 per DALY cost-effectiveness standard. 
 
 
5. Sensitivity analyses 
 
 In this section, we discuss the cost-effectiveness of a vaccine purchase commitment 
program when the base case assumptions are varied.  The sensitivity analyses reported below 
also highlight the key aspects of a vaccine that make it cost effective and that therefore 
should be considered in the choice of eligibility criteria for a product to be purchased under 
the program.  
The cost-effectiveness of the vaccine is relatively insensitive to changes in 
assumptions about efficacy, take-up rates, and the per immunized-person price offered.  For 
example, a malaria vaccine that was only 50 percent effective would still cost less than $20 
per DALY. Figure 1 shows the relationship between efficacy and cost per DALY, holding 
constant all other inputs, including the set of countries participating in the program. Even a 
30 percent effective vaccine would be highly cost-effective. 
 
Even if adoption of the vaccine is very slow, the program would still remain very 
cost-effective from a public health perspective and would still provide a considerable 
amount of revenue to the vaccine developer – although somewhat less revenue than in the 
case of a quickly adopted vaccine, since under this type of contract the value of payments for 
the high-price vaccine doses declines as a result of discounting if these vaccinations are 
pushed further into the future. Even if it takes fifteen years for adoption to reach steady-
state levels and adoption only reached levels ten percentage points below the DPT3 rates, 
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the program would still cost less than $20 per DALY saved and would generate $2.7 billion 
in NPV of revenue for biopharmaceutical companies (in 2004 dollars).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Vaccine efficacy and cost-effectiveness
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A vaccine commitment would also be cost-effective at the time of vaccine 
development under a wide range of contract provisions.  For example, to match the 
revenues of drugs falling between the 70th and 80th percentile and generating a market 
roughly comparable to $3.61 billion in net present value of sales, a commitment could offer 
$17 per person immunized for the first 200 million people immunized, at a cost of about $16 
per DALY saved. To match the revenues of drugs falling between the 80th and 90th 
percentile and generating a market roughly comparable to $5.73 billion in net present value 
of sales, a commitment could offer $25 per person immunized for the first 250 million 
people immunized, at a cost of about $23 per DALY saved.  As discussed below, if raising 
the price offered per person immunized accelerated the vaccine development time, a higher 
commitment might prove more attractive than a lower one. 
 
Cost-effectiveness is sensitive to assumptions about the number of doses and the 
duration of protection.  Even vaccines with relatively low efficacy will be cost effective if 
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they can be delivered with the current (three-dose) EPI vaccine package, because adding one 
additional vaccine to this package is relatively inexpensive.  We have assumed in the baseline 
case a $0.75 cost of adding a three-dose vaccine, although even at several multiples of this 
the delivery would be quite inexpensive.  For example, assuming an incremental delivery cost 
of triple that amount ($2.25 per person immunized) increases the cost per DALY saved to 
about $20 if the set of countries included is held fixed, and augments the cost per DALY by 
only pennies if we assume that only countries in which the vaccine would be cost-effective at 
delivery cost adopt the vaccine. In contrast, delivery outside the EPI schedule would be 
relatively costly. For example, at our assumed cost of $5 per dose, adding two doses outside 
of the EPI schedule would bring the cost per DALY to about $60 per DALY saved if the set 
of participating countries is held constant, or about $25 per DALY if countries with low 
disease burdens opt out because delivery of the vaccine would not be cost-effective. 
 
Similarly, cost-effectiveness is sensitive to changing assumptions about duration of 
protection.  Because malaria primarily kills children under the age of five who have not yet 
gained natural immunity, the cost per DALY increases rapidly for vaccines that provide less 
than five years of protection. For example, if a vaccine provided only two years of 
protection, the cost per DALY saved would rise to $26.  This number would decrease if 
people could be re-vaccinated but would depend on how often boosters were needed. A 
lesson to be learned from these sensitivity analyses is that any vaccine commitment for 
malaria should take these considerations into account when specifying the product profile. 
 
Cost-effectiveness in the case of accelerated development and distribution 
 
The above calculations demonstrate that once a vaccine is developed, purchasing 
vaccine at the pre-specified price would be a very cost-effective expenditure. There is little 
reason to fear, therefore, that a vaccine commitment would tie donors to future purchases 
that would not be worthwhile, if a vaccine were developed. We now examine a somewhat 
more complex issue – namely, the value of the commitment in accelerating the development 
and distribution of a vaccine.  To assess this, we need to make assumptions about what 
would have happened in the absence of a commitment.  
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In the absence of a price commitment both development and adoption of the 
vaccine could be pushed further into the future. Although it is difficult to know how much a 
vaccine commitment would speed up vaccine development, one indication that the effect 
may be substantial comes from the Orphan Drug Act. While only ten new orphan drugs 
were discovered in the decade prior to the Orphan Drug Act, 200 were discovered in the 
next decade (Grabowski [2003]). A vaccine commitment is also likely to substantially 
accelerate access in the poorest countries since the sponsor’s price is paid on a per-person 
immunized basis. When the hepatitis B vaccine was introduced at $30 per dose, it was rarely 
used in low-income countries (Muraskin [1995], Galambos [1995]). The historical record 
suggests adoption of new vaccines in developing countries could be delayed by ten to 15 
years in the absence of a purchase commitment.18 Given that malaria kills a million people 
each year, the health benefits of speeding development and adoption of a malaria vaccine 
would be tremendous.  
 
If a vaccine purchase commitment advanced vaccine development by ten years and 
accelerated access in poor countries by ten years, it would still cost only about $23 per 
additional DALY saved. Even in the extreme case in which a price commitment accelerated 
vaccine development by only one year and adoption in poor countries by only two years, the 
program would cost about $80-$90 per additional DALY saved—still slightly less than the 
$100 per DALY cost-effectiveness threshold for the poorest countries. 
 
By a similar line of reasoning, if increases in the size of the commitment accelerated 
development of a vaccine, it may be worthwhile to undertake a larger commitment. As 
previously discussed, paying $25 per person for the first 250 million people immunized 
rather than $15 per person for the first 200 million people would roughly meet the average 
net present value of products between the 80th and 90th percentiles of existing commercial 
                                                 
18 We estimate delays in access based on the historical record, but one could argue that the circumstances 
would be different now or in the future. However, if one believes that even in the absence of a commitment, 
donors would immediately buy a vaccine and distribute it at an on-patent price comparable to the initial price 
offered under the vaccine commitment, then the cost of purchasing and distributing the vaccine would be the 
same with or without a vaccine commitment, and any benefits of accelerated development associated with 
announcing a commitment in advance would be without cost in the ultimate price tag for a vaccine. In this 
case, if the money will be spent on the vaccine anyway, it is clearly more cost-effective to reap the benefits of 
faster development by announcing this policy in advance and entering into a vaccine commitment.  Conversely, 
if one believes that companies would have to give away a vaccine in poor countries at cost, it is difficult to 
argue that a vaccine commitment would not be critical in advancing vaccine development. 
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products. The larger commitment would cost less than $100 per additional DALY saved if it 
advanced development and adoption by only three years relative to the smaller commitment, 
and would cost about $26 per DALY saved overall. 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
 A variety of simulations suggest that under a large range of values, a vaccine 
commitment may be sufficient to stimulate substantial research towards a malaria vaccine yet 
still be extremely cost-effective.  Our estimates suggest that a commitment of $3.1 billion in 
2004 dollars in net present value of sales would be appropriate. Of course in expectation, the 
larger the commitment, the more biopharmaceutical firms will enter the search for a vaccine, 
and the faster a vaccine is likely to be developed.   
 
We focused here on the example of a malaria vaccine; however, our general analysis 
applies more broadly.  In particular, estimates for HIV and tuberculosis vaccines analogous 
to those presented here for malaria can be derived via the downloadable spreadsheet tool. 
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Appendix. 
 
This appendix presents the sales revenue data underlying our analysis in Section 3.  Special 
thanks to Professor Henry Grabowski of Duke University for generously sharing this data 
with us. 
 
 mean product product in top decile 
year sales NPV of sales  
(8% real cost of capital)
NPV of sales  
(11% real cost of capital)
sales NPV of sales  
(8% real cost of capital) 
NPV of sales (11% 
real cost of capital) 
t=-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
t=0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
t=1 (launch) 83.0 83.0 83.0 293.5 293.5 293.5 
t=2 155.6 144.1 140.2 545.6 505.2 491.5 
t=3 211.6 181.4 171.7 791.0 678.2 642.0 
t=4 267.6 212.4 195.7 1094.8 869.1 800.5 
t=5 325.7 239.4 214.5 1447.7 1064.1 953.6 
t=6 371.6 252.9 220.5 1729.4 1177.0 1026.3 
t=7 414.7 261.3 221.7 2000.4 1260.6 1069.5 
t=8 434.5 253.5 209.3 2200.5 1284.0 1059.9 
t=9 457.4 247.1 198.5 2381.2 1286.5 1033.3 
t=10 457.8 229.0 179.0 2503.5 1252.4 978.7 
t=11 444.4 205.8 156.5 2539.2 1176.1 894.3 
t=12 441.4 189.3 140.0 2587.2 1109.6 820.9 
t=13 416.2 165.3 119.0 2582.1 1025.4 738.1 
t=14 391.8 144.1 100.9 2565.9 943.5 660.8 
t=15 307.8 104.8 71.4 1989.8 677.4 461.6 
t=16 232.1 73.2 48.5 1486.0 468.4 310.6 
t=17 185.7 54.2 35.0 1188.8 347.0 223.8 
t=18 148.5 40.1 25.2 951.0 257.0 161.3 
t=19 118.8 29.7 18.2 760.8 190.4 116.3 
t=20 95.1 22.0 13.1 608.6 141.0 83.8 
sum 5961.3 3132.8 2561.8 32247.0 16006.4 12820.2 
sum in 2004$ 6539.4 3436.6 2810.3 35374.3 17558.7 14063.5 
less 10%  
(for lower 
marketing 
expenditures) 
5885.5 3092.9 2529.3 31836.9 15802.8 12657.2 
 
Notes: All figures are in millions of year 2000 dollars, except as noted otherwise.  The sales distribution for the 
mean product, as presented above, was scaled for several cases discussed in this paper such that the peak (year 
10) sales were equal to the following: $500 million for the “industry outsider” estimate, $100 million for the 
outside-of-program purchases market estimate, and $865.2 million for the hepatitis B vaccine market estimate.    
Details of these calculations are available online at: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/vaccine.html.   
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